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THE THIRD REVOLUTION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CARL T. BOGUS*
We are on the threshold of a third revolution in products liability.
Only now are we becoming aware that we are at the edge of some-
thing significant. The future is always shrouded, and it is by no means
certain that we will cross the threshold before us. Voices are ex-
horting us to turn back. Nevertheless, we are being propelled for-
ward, not so much as a result of a conscious decision, as by the
momentum of choices made over the course of a century-by the
force of history itself.
The realization that we are on the verge of a revolution in prod-
ucts liability is so recent that there is not even a consensus on what to
call it. Among the handful of commentators who have addressed the
issue heretofore, the concept has been variously labelled generic lia-
bility,' generic product risk,2 categorical liability,3 and product cate-
gory liability.4 None of these terms is self-explanatory, however, and
none of them is as of yet familiar to most lawyers, judges, or even tort
scholars.
What is generic liability, and why is it important? A definition
can easily be given: Generic liability is strict liability that is imposed
upon products that are unreasonably dangerous despite the best possi-
ble design, construction, and warnings. It is, in other words, strict lia-
bility that attaches to an entire product category-asbestos, handguns,
and cigarettes are three of the most notorious possibilities-rather
than flawed units or poorly designed models. An explanation of the
significance of generic liability cannot be given quite so succinctly,
* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. The author thanks
members of the faculty of Roger Williams University School of Law for their helpful comments
at a presentation of an oral version of this article.
1. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products
Liability, 60 Mo. L Rav. 1, 30-38 (1995).
2. See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and For Strict
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853 (1983).
3. See Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should be Kept Closed,
36 S. TEx. L. REV. 385 (1995).
4. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Lia-
bility Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991) [herein-
after Henerson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier]; Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in their
Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61
TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994).
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however. Because generic liability represents a third revolution in
products liability-a revolution that flows from what has gone
before-it is best explained in historical context.
THE FIRST REVOLUTION: STRICT LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
The first revolution in products liability created strict liability for
defective products. If we were to fix a date on which it began it would
be 1916, when the New York Court of Appeals handed down an opin-
ion in the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.5 The plaintiff in
that case was severely injured when one of the wooden wheels on his
new Buick automobile collapsed.6 Injured consumers had previously
been barred from suing manufacturers by the privity rule, which held
that manufacturers owed no duty-under either contract or negli-
gence law-to anyone other than the immediate purchaser. In the era
of mass produced goods, the immediate purchaser was not the con-
sumer but a distributor or retailer, and thus manufacturers such as
Buick had been immune from liability to the ultimate users of their
goods. With MacPherson, Cardozo launched not only-as he, himself,
later described it-an "assault upon the citadel of privity,"' 7 but an
attack upon a larger fortress: the concept that one may be held ac-
countable to another only if one has so agreed (e.g., by giving a war-
ranty) or has done something wrong (e.g., by acting negligently).
MacPherson did not go this far, of course. It was a negligence
case and stood only for the modest proposition that a manufacturer of
a product that is "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made" is "under a duty to make it carefully."18 The
manufacturer owed this duty not only to the immediate purchaser but
also to anyone who could be reasonably expected to use the prod-
uct-or, as Cardozo put it, "where danger is to be foreseen, a liability
will follow."9 Yet we must believe that Cardozo knew where the logic
of his decision would run. By placing the fact that the automobile is a
"thing of danger" at the center of his rationale, Cardozo fashioned a
decision that was clearly analogous to areas where courts were impos-
ing liability regardless of whether the defendant had acted negli-
5. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
6. See id.
7. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931).
8. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
9. Id.
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gently.10 Owners of dangerous animals, both wild and domestic, were
subject to liability," for example, and many American jurisdictions
imposed strict liability on persons engaging in abnormally dangerous
activities.12
Someone with less skill and foresight than Cardozo may have
considered MacPherson a poor weapon for launching an attack on the
established legal regime. Plaintiff's negligence theory was weak. Bu-
ick did not make the car's wheels; it purchased them from a reputable
wheel manufacturer.' 3 Plaintiff's argument was that the wheel manu-
facturer had not used the strongest type of wood.14 But what had Bu-
ick done wrong? Nothing more than relying on the expertise of the
wheel manufacturer and not inspecting the wheels itself. This was
hardly a powerful theme. It was not patently unreasonable for Buick
to rely on a firm that had greater expertise with a particular compo-
nent than Buick, itself, possessed.
Yet it was the very weakness of the negligence claim that suited
Cardozo's purposes. "We have put aside the notion that the duty to
safeguard life and limb, when consequences of negligence may be
foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else," Cardozo wrote.15
"We have put the source of obligation where it ought to be. We have
put its source in the law."'1 6 Though he was careful to expressly in-
clude it, the concept of negligence recedes in Cardozo's opinion. It is
considerations of public policy that come to the fore. If we substitute
the term "product failure" for "negligence" in the above passage, no
harm is done to Cardozo's reasoning; if anything, it stands on even
firmer legs. This, one suspects, was not unintentional, for Cardozo
was a master craftsman.
Thus a revolution began. Flying in the face of an ingrained socie-
tal norm-that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, only
people who were somehow culpable were to be held accountable to
10. Cardozo refused to confine his reasoning within the previously accepted principle that
products that posed an imminent danger to life-such as poisons and explosives-may constitute
exceptions to the privity rule. See id.
11. Owners of domestic animals were liable only when the owner knew that a particular
animal had dangerous propensities. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 513-17 (3d ed.
1964) and cases collected therein.
12. See id. at 523 n.90, 524-25 nn.10-34 (citing cases from at least ten jurisdictions that by
1916 had adopted the principle set forth in Rylands v. Fletcher).
13. DAVID W. PECK, DECISION AT LAW 40-64 (1961).
14. See id. at 47.
15. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
16. See id.
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others-the law was to make one of the most powerful groups in mod-
em society, manufacturers, responsible not for fault but for failure.
Revolutions of this magnitude are not completed overnight. It
was half a century later when William Prosser could finally declare
that the citadel had fallen. 17 By then, 1966, eighteen states's-includ-
ing the commercial giants of New Jersey,19 California,20 and New
York21-had recently adopted strict liability for defective products,
and the American Law Institute had just endorsed the principle in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.22 In a relatively short time thereafter,
every other American jurisdiction followed suit.
There is a tendency to assume that the early concept of defect
was roughly equivalent to what we now call manufacturing defects,
but that is not precisely accurate. The first revolution was not limited
to manufacturing defects. MacPherson's Buick collapsed either be-
cause the wheel contained a flaw or because it-and all of Buick's
wheels-was made from the wrong kind of wood. And MacPherson is
by no means unique in this regard. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc. ,23 a car crashed because of an undetermined problem in the
steering mechanism. The power tool in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.24 failed because the set screws were not adequate for
the machine's vibration. Each of these cases may have involved a
manufacturing defect, a design defect, or some combination of the
two.25 It did not so much matter why the product was defective, only
that it was defective.
While no single definition of "defective product" was adequate-
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists seven alterna-
tive definitions of "defective product"26-it is probably fair to say the
concept was connected more to result than cause. That is, products
17. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MiN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
18. See id. at 794-95.
19. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
20. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
21. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963). Goldberg is the
least well-known of this trio of decisions. The opinion is ambivalent. On one hand it bills itself
as nothing more than the logical result of the "things of danger" doctrine adopted in MacPher-
son. See id. at 82-83. On the other hand, it cites and seems to stand with Henningsen and Green-
man. See id.
22. RESTATEMENr (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 402(A) (1977).
23. 161 A.2d at 75.
24. 377 P.2d at 899.
25. Many early cases make it clear that a product might be defective as a result of either a
manufacturing or design defect. See e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 808 (Or.
1967) ("plaintiff can produce direct evidence of a mistake in fabrication or of a design which is
unreasonably dangerous").
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1977).
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were defective if they failed in performance, regardless of the reason
for failure. In most first revolution cases, however, products failed on
their own, without anything that may have been thought of as an in-
tervening cause.
THE SECOND REVOLUTION: STRICr LIABILITY FOR NONDEFECTIVE
PRODUCTS WITH UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS FEATURES
If MacPherson's Buick illustrates the first revolution, the Ford
Pinto exemplifies the second. Intent on producing a subcompact that
would weigh less than 2,000 pounds and be priced at less than $2,000,
Ford made deliberate design choices that left the gas tank on the Pinto
automobile vulnerable in rear-end collisions.27 The gas tank was lo-
cated behind rather than above the rear axle, where it had tradition-
ally been placed to protect it from being ripped open or crushed in
accidents. 28 To limit weight, the rear bumper was nothing more than
an ornamental chrome strip and it offered no protection. 29 In crash
tests, Ford engineers discovered that the gas tank had a tendency to
explode in low speed accidents. 30 They suggested a number of solu-
tions such as lining the gas tank with a rubber bladder at a cost of
between $5.25 and $8.00 per car or reinforcing the rear-end of the car
with side and cross members for $4.20 per car.31 But pennies counted
in the struggle to keep the car priced below $2,000 and Ford officials.
rejected all of the proposals.32
MacPherson's Buick and the Ford Pinto both imperilled their oc-
cupants, but they did so in different ways. MacPherson's Buick failed
on its own accord. It was not mishandled or mistreated in any fashion;
it was doing exactly what it was supposed to do-simply driving
along-when it collapsed. The Pinto, on the other hand, exploded
only when subjected to an external force, another car smashing into
the Pinto from behind. Everyone understands perfectly well that cars
should not be mistreated in this fashion. The Pinto failed only when
its owner or some third party did something wrong,3 3 or, in the lan-
27. See Bogus, supra note 1, at 77.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 78.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. The most famous Pinto case represents something of an exception. The Pinto was
struck from behind after it stalled on a superhighway, perhaps as a result of some other defect.
See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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guage of negligence law, only when there was an intervening cause. 34
The problem with the Pinto, therefore, was not that the Pinto was
defective, at least in any traditional understanding of that term. The
Pinto was not mismanufactured, broken, or faulty; it was built and
functioned exactly as intended. It is a large leap from the proposition
that manufacturers should be liable for injuries caused by product fail-
ure to the proposition that manufacturers should be liable because
their products did not protect users from the users' own, or some third
party's, negligence.
The crashworthiness doctrine-which holds that vehicles should
provide a reasonable degree of protection in accidents-was not em-
braced easily. A 1966 case,35 for example, arose out of an automobile
in which a man was killed in a side impact collision. Plaintiff argued
that the steel frame of Defendant's station wagon should have been
rectangular and contiguous, surrounding, and thus protecting, the
cabin and its occupants. 36 The court wrote:
Plaintiff argues that the defendant's 'X' frame permitted the side of
the automobile to collapse against the decedent when his station
wagon was struck broadside by another vehicle. Plaintiff does not
assert the 'X' frame caused the decedent's automobile to be driven
into the path of the striking car or prevented it from being driven
out of the path. 37
The court held that there was no liability because the car was not unfit
for its intended purpose. "The intended purpose of an automobile
does not include its participation in collisions with other objects," it
wrote.38
This way at looking at things could not last. Although, as previ-
ously discussed, it is not strictly accurate to say that the first revolution
included manufacturing defects and excluded design defects, it is true
nonetheless that manufacturing flaws vere clearly included within the
concept of defective products while design hazards were doctrinally
more ambiguous. Yet the public is exposed to greater risks from
products with unsafe features than from those with manufacturing de-
fects. Design hazards make every unit in a product line dangerous
34. One may believe that Ford executives acted irresponsibility in selling cars with gas tanks
that, they knew, were prone to explode in rear-end collisions. For what it is worth, their defense
is that the Pinto was no more dangerous than other American subcompacts at the time-which
was true, but only because other subcompacts had their own problems. See Bogus, supra note 1,
at 80 n.424.
35. See Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
36. See id. at 824.
37. Id1
38. Id. at 825.
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while manufacturing defects affect only occasional units, thus the for-
mer greatly exceeds the latter. Any doctrine that confronts lesser
risks rather than greater ones will inevitably become unstable.
It is not surprising, therefore, that eleven years after the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff who challenged the
frame of a station wagon did not state a cause of action, the same
court adopted the crashworthiness doctrine. 39 "[M]anufacturers must
anticipate and take precautions against reasonably foreseeable risks in
use of their products," it held/ ° And in language diametrically op-
posed to the reasoning of its earlier opinion, the court noted that "a
collision is a foreseeable incident of [a vehicle's] normal use. Thus, to
say that collisions are not within their 'intended purpose' is unrealis-
tic." 41 The crashworthiness doctrine is now well accepted,42 and it has
paid large dividends in lower automobile fatality rates.43
Another example of the second revolution are cases involving
guards and mechanisms designed to protect machine operators from
their own negligence. These cases have involved both consumer prod-
ucts and industrial machinery, but particularly the latter. Courts have
recognized that the reality of the work place makes employees work
on machines that they did not choose, with coworkers whom they did
not hire, under conditions-including time-pressured production
schedules-over which they have little control. The earliest cases in
this category involved machines without guards or deadman devices,"
but there has also been a second generation of cases where manufac-
turers provide protection devices, but fail to design their machines in a
way that makes it impossible for employers to remove those devices.45
Courts have become savvy. They learned that employers often want
to remove guards to speed up production, and that some manufactur-
ers are willing to oblige by selling machines that make this possible. 46
39. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977). Both Huff and Evans, 359
F.2d 822, were decided under Indiana law.
40. Huff, 565 F.2d at 108.
41. Id.
42. The crashworthiness doctrine has been accepted by the vast majority of jurisdictions,
and has applied not only to automobiles, but to airplanes, boats, trucks, snowmobiles,
lawnmowers, and many other types of vehicles. See Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d
1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1989).
43. See, Bogus, supra note 1, at 4 n.9.
44. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
45. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125, 1987 WL 6486 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
9, 1987).
46. See, e.g., Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985); E.W. Bliss Co. v.
Superior Court, 258 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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Courts have become wise about similar dynamics in other indus-
tries as well. They have, for example, become familiar with cases in-
volving pharmaceutical companies who over-promote certain drugs
knowing-and since actions speak louder than words, one must be-
lieve also intending-that physicians are prescribing them when not
indicated 47 or using them for purposes not approved by FDA.48
The second revolution has been obscured by nomenclature.49
There is not truly anything defective about a car with an X frame or a
machine that does not have an interlock device so that it will not oper-
ate if the guard is removed. The label "design defect" is a misnomer,
a remnant of the first generation. These cases involve nondefective
products with unreasonably dangerous features. The linchpin of lia-
bility is an unreasonably dangerous aspect or feature of the product.
In the Ford Pinto case, for example, it was a gas tank vulnerable to
explosion.
The continued use of the word "defect" hides the fact that the
second revolution represents a radical departure. The first revolu-
tion-which was truly defect-oriented-was premised on the idea that
the consumer did not get what he bargained for, and hence originally
defined "defect" in terms of consumer expectation. The first revolu-
tion was principally rooted in contract law. The second revolution was
concerned not only with the seller-buyer relationship but also with
how products affect society-at-large. The linchpin of liability is not
defect, but unreasonable danger and consequently, the risk-utility test
has largely replaced the consumer expectation theory. The second
revolution, therefore, sprang from tort law.
I have described these two models at greater length elsewhere.50
I call the contract-based model Abinger's Paradigm after Lord Ab-
inger who wrote the famous 1842 decision in Winterbottom v.
Wright.51 The tort-based model I call Cardozo's Paradigm for, ironi-
cally, when Cardozo wrote the opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., he started not only the first revolution in products liability but the
second as well. As noted above, Cardozo emphasized that the doc-
47. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke, Davis and Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975).
48. See Proctor v. Davis, 656 N.E.2d 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
49. The transition from the first to the second revolutions has been blurred because courts
define "defect" in terms of unreasonable danger. For example, "[a] 'defect' does not mean a
mere mechanical or functional defect but is anything that makes the product 'unreasonably dan-
gerous."' Anderson v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637, 643 (Colo. 1988).
50. See Bogus, supra note 1, at 9-30.
51. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. D. 1842).
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trine he fashioned did not grow "out of contract and nothing else."52
"We have put the source of obligation where it ought to be," he
wrote.53 "We have put its source in the law."'54
Cardozo's vision is very much part of the second revolution, even
if the law had to evolve through a first revolution in order to catch up.
And perhaps it is part and parcel of the third revolution as well.
THE THIRD REVOLUTION: STRICT LIABILITY FOR
UNREASONABLY
DANGEROUS PRODUCTS
The third revolution in products liability is strict liability that is
imposed upon products that are unreasonably dangerous despite the
best possible design, construction, and warnings. To many-including
Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. TWerski, the Re-
porters for the forthcoming Restatement (Third) of Torts-that seems
like a radical concept.5 5 But in fact the third is the least radical of the
three revolutions. After all, if strict liability attaches to products with
unreasonably dangerous features how can it not reasonably attach to
unreasonably dangerous products?
When one thinks of generic liability, politically controversial sub-
jects such as cigarettes and handguns tend to leap to mind, but it is in
prosaic cases where the third revolution is silently underway.
Consider Shetterly v. Crown Control Corp.,56 a 1989 decision of
eight consolidated cases involving plaintiffs who all suffered sprained,
twisted, or broken ankles while using a unique type of machine known
as a Crown Pallet Truck during the course of their employment in a
grocery warehouse. The pallet truck is a motorized vehicle used to
collect boxes of groceries from the warehouse floor.57 The truck con-
sists of a set of forks upon which rest wooden pallets, which are used
as a platform for stacking cartons of groceries. 58 Unlike a fork lift,
which is used to raise and lower objects, the pallet truck is used to
collect boxes stored at ground level, and the pallet cannot be raised
52. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF ToRmS: PRODUCTS LIABILIrY § 2 cmt. c, and Reporters'
Note at 94-97 (Tentative Draft No. 2, March 13, 1995); Henderson & TWerski, Closing the Fron-
tier, supra note 4, at 1314-15.
56. 719 F. Supp. 385 (W.D. Pa. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1990).
57. See id. at 389.
58. See id.
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more than a few inches above floor level.5 9 The operator controls the
truck by using handles perpendicularly affixed to a control arm at the
front end of the vehicle. 6° These handles permit the operator to oper-
ate the pallet truck while either riding on the platform or walking
alongside the vehicle. 61
One of the principal features of the pallet truck is a "coast control
device," which allows the truck to coast slowly to a stop.62 If the oper-
ator releases the handle when he is beside an item he wishes to pick
up, the vehicle will coast to a stop so that the pallet is right next to that
item.63 By eliminating the need to carry cartons even short distances,
the coast control device cumulatively saves great amounts of time.64
Operators are not injured if they ride on or walk beside the truck.
Plaintiffs, however, all released the control handle before they were
beside cartons they wished to pick up and walked in front of the vehi-
cle while it was coasting. 65 The pallet truck struck them at ankle
height. 66
The court first considered whether there was a feasible alterna-
tive design that would have prevented plaintiffs' injuries.67 Experts
testified that the control handles could not be made longer without
interfering the operator's ability to ride on the vehicle, the platform
could not be lowered or equipped with a rubber guard because the
vehicle had to clear debris that inevitably litters warehouse floors, and
the coast control device could not be eliminated without destroying
the pallet truck's raison d'etre-its great efficiency. 68 Thus, the court
concluded there was no feasible alternative design. 69
Next, the court conducted a risk-utility analysis to determine
whether pallet trucks are unreasonably dangerous.70 It found that pal-
let trucks have high utility.71 After the plaintiffs' firm introduced
Crown Pallet Trucks to its operation, the productivity of its assem-
blers-workers such as the plaintiffs who assemble orders by retriev-
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 390.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 391.
66. See id. at 392.
67. See id. at 393-94.
68. See id. at 393-95.
69. See id.
70. See id. 395-99.
71. See id. at 397.
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ing cartons of groceries from various locations in the warehouse-
increased fifty-three percent.72 Pallet trucks reduced assembly costs
for this firm by more than two million dollars annually, and the court
found these savings ultimately resulted in lower food prices for con-
sumers.73 On the risk side of the ledger, the evidence was that the
foot injuries for assemblers working on pallet truck occurred at a rate
of only one injury per four hundred work years.74 Meanwhile, pallet
trucks resulted in fewer back injuries, which were more frequent and
on average more severe than foot injuries. 75 The court found, there-
fore, that pallet trucks were not unreasonably dangerous, and dis-
missed the action.76
What should not go unnoticed is this: The court did not end its
analysis after determining that there was no alternative feasible de-
sign; it went on to determine whether the product's risks outweighed
its benefits, and presumably would have imposed liability if they had.
This is classic generic liability analysis.
Shetterly is not an extraordinary case. It is representative of how
many courts conduct risk-utility analyses to determine whether a
product generically should be deemed unreasonably dangerous and,
consequently, subject to strict liability. The same approach may
be found in cases involving a host of other products including
72. See id.
73. See id. at 398.
74. See id. at 400.
75. See id. at 397.
76. See id. at 403.
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medical devices,77 contraceptives, 78 prescription drugs,79 blood, 80
rat poison,81 ladders,8 2 and all-terrain vehicles, 83 to name a
77. See Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881 (Okla. 1994). This case involved a penile
implant that failed less than two years after implantation because of cable fatigue, which was
apparently an unpreventable risk. See id. The court stated that a manufacturer has an affirma-
tive defense under comment k to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) Torts-i.e., as unavoidably
unsafe product-only when the benefits of the product outweigh its risk. See id. at 885-86. Not-
ing that the implants had a failure rate of between 3.7% and 6%, and that penile implants have
high utility because they restored "a degree of normalcy to the lives of those who suffer sexual
dysfunction," the court held that the jury could reasonably find that the product's benefits out-
weighed its risks. Id. at 887; see also Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432 (D. Minn.
1988) (involving an intrauterine device).
78. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986). This case involved
a birth control pill with an extra high dosage of estrogen, which was necessary to prevent break-
through bleeding in certain women. See id. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for
a jury to find that increased risks of adverse reactions outweighed the product's benefits and
that, therefore, the product was unreasonably dangerous and subject to strict liability. See id. at
414. The court held the converse was also true: there was enough evidence to warrant a finding
that the product's utility greatly outweighed its risks, in which case there would be no liability.
See id. at 414-15. This is an unnecessarily confusing method of analysis. There are not truly two
questions, only two sides of the same coin. If plaintiff fails to persuade the trier of fact that the
product's risks exceed its benefits, plaintiffs case fails, and defendant's affirmative defense
under comment k is superfluous.
79. One example of many is Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I.
1988). In this case, which involved the drug DES, the Rhode Island Supreme Court wrote:
"[W]e reject defendant's specious contention that a prescription drug, a fixed chemical composi-
tion, cannot be defectively designed because there are no alternatives to its configuration." Id
at 781. The court continued: "If a trial judge concludes that reasonable minds could not differ in
deciding that a drug's benefits exceed its risks, then as a matter of law the trial judge can extend
comment k's protection to that drug. If, however, the judge finds that an application of the risk-
benefit analysis allows reasonable minds to differ in their conclusions, then the trial judge should
submit the issue to the trier of fact." Id. at 782. As discussed in the preceding note, it makes
more sense to consider the risk-utility analysis to be a test of liability than a method of establish-
ing an affirmative defense. The Castrignano court more simply could have held that plaintiff is
entitled to have its case submitted to the jury only if the court determines that a reasonable
person could find that a product's risks exceed its benefits. Nevertheless, Castrignano illustrates
that courts sometimes apply generic liability doctrine in pharmaceutical cases, though that is
often obscured by the confusion surrounding comment k. See also, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Labo-
ratories, 732 P.2d 297, 306 (Idaho 1987) (instructing that the "weighing process should consider
the value of the benefit, the seriousness of the risk, and the likelihood of both"); Gaston v.
Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
80. See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 122 (Colo. 1983)
(holding that the "product's utility must greatly outweigh the risk created by its use" for defend-
ant to invoke the unavoidably unsafe defense of comment k).
81. See Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 675 (Ga. 1994) (stating that "we can no
longer accept the position that a manufacturer cannot be liable for injuries proximately caused
by a product that functions for its intended use, regardless of the risks associated with the prod-
uct and its utility to the public or the plaintiff's ability to adduce evidence that a feasible alterna-
tive design [exists]").
82. See Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d 1269, 1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(noting that in an appropriate case a jury may "find that the risks involved in a product's use
outweigh its utility even though there is no reasonably feasible alternative design").
83. See Laing v. American Honda Motor Co., 628 So. 2d 196, 201 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (stat-
ing that a product may be unreasonably dangerous if" a reasonable person would conclude that
the danger-in-fact ... outweighs the usefulness of the product.") The court held that the jury's
verdict that three-wheel, all-terrain vehicles are unreasonably dangerous was supported by the
evidence. See id. at 202. The jury weighed the benefits and the risks of ATV's as farm instru-
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few.84
Generic liability has not yet been consciously embraced by courts
throughout the land. But claims to the contrary notwithstanding, 85 it
has not been rejected either.86 Indeed, only one published court opin-
ion expressly refers to generic liability.8 7 Yet in cases such as Shetterly
courts are employing generic liability analysis all the time.
Battles over generic liability are being fought in three arenas.
One arena is the American Law Institute, which is in the process of
promulgating the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The outcome of this
battle was preordained when the ALI selected as Reporters for the
products liability sections of the Restatement the two most vociferous
critics of generic liability, Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and
Aaron D. Twerski.88 The proposed Restatement eliminates generic lia-
bility by making an alternative feasible design a prerequisite for main-
taining a design defect claim. The applicable section provides that "a
product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design ... and the omission of
the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe."'89 The
comments state: "The requirement... that plaintiff show a reasonable
alternative design applies even though the plaintiff alleges that the
category of product sold by the defendant is so dangerous that it
should not have been marketed at all." 90
ments; the evidence regarding their utility as recreational vehicles was excluded. See id. This is
not inconsistent with the theory of generic liability. Some products may be unreasonably dan-
gerous when sold to the public-at-large but not when sold to a particular class of purchasers. For
example, x-ray equipment may be reasonably dangerous when sold to licensed facilities, and
handguns may be reasonably dangerous when sold to law enforcement officers, even if such
products are unreasonably dangerous when sold to the public-at-large.
84. See Bogus, supra note 1, at 37 (describing other cases involving slingshots, above-
ground swimming pools, and escalators).
85. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1520-21 (1992); Henderson &
Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 4, at 1315.
86. See Bogus, supra note 1, at 36-64.
87. In the famous Cipollone cigarette case, the Third Circuit held that plaintiff's "generic
risk-utility claim" was not retroactively barred by a state tort reform statute and should not have
been dismissed by the district court. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 577-78 (3rd
Cir. 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, affid in part, 505 U.S. 504, 512 n.6 (1992). This issue
was not raised on appeal before the Supreme Court. See id. The case was voluntarily withdrawn
following the Supreme Court's decision and before the generic liability could be tried. See
Henry J. Reske, Cigarette Suit Dropped, 79 A.B.A. J. 30 (Feb. 1993).
88. See Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 4.
89. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY §2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
March 13, 1995).
90. Id. at cnt. c.
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Henderson and Twerski contend that the alternative design re-
quirement "reflects a clear majority of the case law." 91 This claim has
been subject to a powerful attack. In a 462-page law review article,
John F. Vargo set forth a survey of the law of all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.92 Vargo found that only three states have
clearly mandated an alternative design by case law.93 Five states
adopted alternative design requirements in politically driven tort re-
form legislation, and case law in one state is ambiguous, but Vargo's
survey shows that no other state has an absolute alternative design
requirement. 94 "[N]ine states do not constitute a majority," Vargo
observes.95
This battle is probably over; the ALI is not likely to change its
position. But some of the most prominent products liability scholars
have been strongly critical of the new Restatement-and of the alter-
native design requirement in particular96-and it is not likely that the
forthcoming Restatement will command the same degree of respect
and acceptance as did section 402A.
A second arena in which the battle over generic liability is being
fought is in litigation over controversial products. Strong attempts are
now underway to impose liability on manufacturers of handguns, 97 as-
sault weapons, 98 and cigarettes.99 As of this writing, for example,
nineteen states and a dozen municipalities are suing tobacco compa-
nies to recover the costs of treating smoking related diseases under
91. John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New
Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a
Different Weave, 26 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 493, 519 (1996).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 537.
94. See id.
95. Id.; see also Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Sec-
tion 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407 (1994) (ana-
lyzing case law from jurisdictions that have considered the alternative design issue and
concluding that a majority of jurisdictions do not require that plaintiff provide evidence of a
reasonable alternative design in order to establish a prima facie case).
96. See Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALl Product Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachro-
nism?, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1105, 1121 (1994); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products
Liability: The ALl Restatement Project, 48 VA, D. L. REV. 631, 668-77 (1995); Vandall, supra
note 95; Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in their Eyes; Product Category Liability and Alter-
native Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994).
97. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, No. CV-95-0049, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6129 (E.D.N.Y.
May 2, 1996); see generally Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products Liability, 59 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1103 (1991).
98. See Barry Meier, Guns Don't Kill, Gun Makers Do?, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 1995, at E3.
99. See Richard Perez-Pena, New York State Sues the Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1997, at B4.
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state Medicaid programs.100 These cases illustrate that generic liabil-
ity cases are not always brought by plaintiffs who have elected to take
risks, only to complain later about the consequences of their choices.
While the only prediction that can be made is that there will be many
twists and turns before the end of the road, plaintiffs in cigarette and
gun cases are in stronger positions than ever before because manufac-
turers in these industries have never been held in lower regard.
Cases involving hot issues such as guns and cigarettes will be es-
pecially visible, and they will have an impact. But, more than any-
thing else, it is likely to be garden variety cases such as Shetterly that
will ultimately decide whether, and when, the third revolution in prod-
ucts liability ultimately succeeds.
THIS SyMpOSIUM
Because the importance of generic liability is only now starting to
be realized, little has been written about it to date. This Symposium
doubles the body of existing scholarship dealing expressly with this
topic. We are fortunate that so distinguished a group of scholars
agreed to participate. They are by no means of one mind on the topic,
but their contributions are all provocative.
Peter A. Bell (Children's Lives, Indonesians' Lives and Generic
Liability) thought about generic liability while on sabbatical in Indo-
nesia and wrote an article in the form of a letter to his two young
daughters. What difference would a regime of generic liability make
in their lives, he wonders. Would generic liability threaten to deprive
them of something they dearly love-ice cream, particularly the high
fat kind? Bell's long letter to his children is a carefully developed
thought-piece about societal values and whether generic liability will
advance or impede them. Bell comes down in favor of generic liability,
but argues that a balance of competing concerns would best be struck
by having generic liability decisions made only by a special, three-
judge federal court. Along the way, Bell presents a compelling chal-
lenge to the argument that generic decisions are too polycentric for
judicial adjudication.
Joseph A. Page (Liability for Unreasonably and Unavoidably Un-
safe Products: Does Negligence Doctrine Have a Role to Play?) prefers
100. See Laura Duncan, Cigarette Makers Race Attorneys General to Court, 82 A.B.A. J. 38
(March 1996); Michael Janofsky, Mississippi Seeks Damages from Tobacco Companies, N.Y.
TiMEs, May 24, 1994, at A12; Clifford J. Levy, New York City Sun Big Tobacco Companies to
Recoup Health Costs, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1996, at B17; Larry Rohter, Florida Prepares New
Basis to Sue Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at Al.
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negligence doctrine to strict liability for products with generic risks.
His concern is not that generic liability will result in courts imposing
liability on too many products-quite the opposite. Page argues that
generic liability unnecessarily burdens plaintiffs with unnecessary bag-
gage, notably the requirement that plaintiffs establish the existence of
a defect. Page prefers negligence because, inter alia, he believes the
principal question in a generic case is whether a manufacturer's deci-
sion to market a particular kind of product was reasonable. Whether
one favors negligence or strict liability as the vehicle for imposing lia-
bility on product categories, however, we must answer the question
whether such decisions should be made by courts at all. Are legisla-
tures or administrative agencies better equipped than courts to decide
whether entire product categories should be marketed or taxed? Are
these political questions? Is it undemocratic for courts to be imposing
strict liability on cigarettes, handguns, or pallet trucks? In this article
Joseph Page gives one of the best responses to this set of questions
that one can hope to find.
Jerry J. Phillips (The Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Lia-
bility) takes on the Reporters of the products liability sections of the
American Law Institute's forthcoming Restatement (Third) of Torts.
His article may scorch their fingers. Accusing the Reporters of "a dis-
tinctive pro-defense bias,"'101 Phillips explains why he believes the Re-
statement "constitutes a major retreat from strict products liability,"' 02
and why the "Reporters cannot validly claim that this retreat repre-
sents the majority view in this country today. ' 103 "Nor," he argues
"can they effectively claim that it represents the better view." 1°4 Phil-
lips argues that the Restatement's distinction between intended and
unintended design flaws is fanciful; that the three kinds of defects ex-
clusively recognized in the Restatement-manufacturing, design, and
warning defects-do not comprise the entire universe of inadequacies
for which courts impose strict liability; and that the Restatement disin-
genuously grants drugs and medical devices immunity from products
liability law by creating a standard that no real world plaintiff can
meet. Phillips, who is the leading contemporary advocate of the con-
sumer expectations test, explains the benefits of consumer expectation
and how he believes it should be applied in the field of generic liabil-
101. Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72 Cm.-KEr'rr L.
REv. 129, 131 (1996).
102. Id. at 142.
103. Id. at 149 (citing studies by Howard C. Klemme, Frank J. Vandall, and John F. Vargo).
104. Id.
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ity. His article, therefore, will be of particular interest to lawyers and
judges in jurisdictions employing the consumer expectation test.
William Powers, Jr. (Is There a Doctrinal Answer to the Question
of Generic Liability?) has written a short but powerful piece. Can a
court "render a legitimate decision either for or against generic
liability?"'105 (i.e., is there a sound doctrinal foundation for either re-
sult?) he asks. Powers sees generic liability as a struggle between utili-
tarianism and the ideology of freedom and consent. Utilitarianism
finds its expression in tort law, and in the risk-utility test in particular,
while the ideology of freedom and consent is secured by contract law.
These competing principles "occur at the very foundation of legal dis-
course,"'1 Powers writes. Is there a normative theory that provides a
compelling answer as to which value should trump the other in the
context of generic products issues? Powers explains why there is
not-why, for example, analyses based in economics or in various con-
ceptions of justice will not do. "Sometimes we just have to choose,"
he concludes. 107 Powers, however, helps us better understand what we
are choosing.
In the tradition of Jonathan Swift, Ellen Wertheimer (Unavoid-
ably Unsafe Products: A Modest Proposal) makes a modest proposal
that is not so modest. Strict products liability should be strict liabil-
ity-which means, she argues, that strict liability should attach to un-
avoidably daiigerous products regardless of whether they fail a risk-
utility test. Indeed, Wertheimer contends that the very reason that
products such as vaccines or ladders pass a risk-utility (i.e., that soci-
ety-at-large benefits from their use) warrants shifting the cost of inju-
ries from individuals on whom they randomly fall to everyone who
benefits from the product.
105. William Powers, Jr., Is There a Doctrinal Answer to the Question of Generic Liability?,
72 Cm.-KE r L. REv. 169, 171 (1996).
106. Id. at 182.
107. Id. at 188.
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